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Abstract 
This paper analyses the need, significance and the advantages of ‘reforms in institutional finance 
for inclusive growth’ in the context of Indian economy and offers some practicable suggestions 
from the functional perspective. India’s Rural Financial Architecture (RFA) is subject to systemic 
policy issues and pervasive institutional weaknesses. Lack of autonomy and weak governance and 
unseen accountability have affected the sustainability of Rural Financial Institutions (RFI) and 
resulted in constrained outreach. Importance of access to institutional finance for the poor arises 
from the problem of financial exclusion of nearly 3 billion people from the formal financial 
services across the world. With only 34% of population engaged in formal banking, this paper 
argues that the reforms in institutional finance coupled with governance reforms in India’s RFA 
would greatly benefit the economy in making available the much-needed financial services to the 
poor and the neglected sections of the society and facilitate the efforts towards achieving inclusive 
growth. 
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1. Introduction 
A well-recognized in economic literature observes that efficient, broad-based and deepened financial markets can lead 
to increased economic growth by improving the efficiency of allocation and utilization of savings in the economy. 
Better functioning financial systems ease the external financing constraints that impede firm and industrial expansion 
and establish strong, positive link between the functioning of the financial system and long-run economic growth
1
. 
 
There can be three dimensions of effective financial systems: (i) First, there is an institutional dimension, which 
includes the regulatory and judicial framework and the quality of institutions, (ii) Second is the market dimension, 
which includes the traditional measures of size and access to finance; financial innovation; and residents’ access to 
finance, and (iv) The third dimension is market performance, including measures of technical efficiency, liquidity, and 
distribution of domestic assets base.  A well-developed financial sector performs the important functions like: (a) 
promote overall savings of the economy by providing alternative instruments; (b) allocate resources efficiently among 
the sectors; and (c) provide an effective channel for the transmission of policy impulses. It is well founded that a 
typical competitive financial sector has characteristics like: (i) there should be large number of buyers and sellers of 
the financial product; (ii) the price of the product is determined by the market forces of demand and supply; (iii) there 
should be a secondary market for the instrument; (iv) turnover of the instruments in both primary and secondary 
markets should be fairly large; and (iv) agencies involved in the process of intermediation between buyers and sellers 
should provide intermediation services at a minimum spread. 
 
India is one of the five countries (along with China, Indonesia, Brazil, and Russia) categorized as big emerging market 
economies (EMEs) by the World Bank as these countries have made the critical transition from a developing country 
to an emerging market. The World Bank has predicted that these big five EMEs’ share of world output will have more 
than doubled from 7.8% in 1992 to 16.1% by 2020. Financial Sector Reforms committee (chair: Narasimham), 1991 
which recommended deregulation of the financial sector in India is the starting point of the reform process which has 
since then rolled forward in several directions. The underlying philosophy of the reforms measures have been to 
develop the different segments of the financial market into an integrated one, so that their inter linkages can reduce 
arbitrage opportunities; help achieve higher level of operational efficiency and monetary policy effectiveness. Even 
though, significant progress has been achieved during the past two decades in terms of policy and institutional 
reforms, Indian financial sector suffers from various institutional inadequacies in propelling financial development 
towards the much-desired inclusive growth. It needs to be addressed as to how far have the reforms initiatives have 
resulted in: (i) narrowing the inter-market divergences; (ii) expansion of financial services to the far and needy in the 
society; (iii) provision of basic financial products like savings, credit, insurance, and payment and transfer facilities; 
(iv) reduction of transaction costs of financial intermediation both for the institutions and the clients; and (v) 
reasonable degree of market integration. 
 
This article attempts to examine the need, role, and effectiveness of Institutional reforms in development finance in 
making services work for the poor in the context of Indian economy. In section 2, the theoretical considerations in the 
context of development economics in support of the institutional reforms drawn from the new institutional economics 
are discussed. Section 3 presents the current state of affairs of the rural financial sector in India with a focus on 
financing for rural and agricultural sector; particularly the structure and performance of Commercial Banks (SCBs) 
Regional Rural Banks (RRBs), Rural Credit Cooperatives and Microfinance Institutions (MFIs). In section 4, the 
discussion on the need for reforming the Indian Rural Financial Architecture is presented with some valuable 
suggestions and finally section 5 provides the summary and conclusion of the article. 
 
2. Institutions and Economic Development 
New Institutional Economics (NIE), which endeavors to integrate a theory of institutions into economics, argues 
that institutions matter, the relationship between institutional structure and economic behavior requires attention, 
and the determinants of institutions can be analyzed with the aid of economic theory. Led by renowned economists 
such as Ronald Coase, who explicitly introduced transaction costs into economic analysis (Coase, 1937), Oliver 
Williamson, who introduced the term ‘transaction costs’ in economic analysis (1975), and Richter (2005). Unlike 
neoclassical economics, the institutional framework is not assumed as given but is explicitly treated as an object of 
research, and the implications of any given institutional arrangements for economic behavior are taken into account 
(Richter, 2005). 
 
2.1 Efficient Institutions and Economic Performance  
                                                          
1
 “Sunlight is the best disinfectant”, wrote Justice Brandeis of United States Supreme Court in a landmark judgment and the phrase was later popularized by the president 
Franklin Roosevelt in justifying the extensive financial sector reforms in 1930s arguing that making public the activities and the state of a financial or industrial firm has a 
number of positive consequences. This underlines the importance of transparency, governance and the need for institutional reforms. 
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Only efficient institutions are growth promoting as they encourage individuals to engage in productive activities by 
rendering appropriate incentives and establishing a stable structure of human interactions that reduce uncertainty. It 
is opined that there can be two types of efficiency: (i) substantive efficiency (i.e., a rule promotes allocative 
efficiency), and (ii) procedural efficiency (i.e., a rule is designed to reduce the cost or increase the accuracy of 
using the system of rules). However, Chu (2003) argues that affluence in developed countries is a cumulative result 
of ‘efficient institutions’, while poverty in poor countries is a result of ‘inefficient institutions’.  
 
Successful institutions are believed to be those that are contract enforcing as well as coercion constraining; that is, 
they reward production and exchange rather than mere expropriation and redistribution. However, on the other 
hand in developing countries, institutional frameworks are found to overwhelmingly favor activities that promote 
redistributive rather than productive activity, that create monopolies rather than competitive conditions, and that 
restrict opportunities rather than expand them (North, 1990). Accordingly, NIE suggests that countries need two 
distinct and (not necessarily) complementary sets of institutions: (i) those that promote exchange by lowering 
transaction costs and promoting trust, and (ii) those that induce the state to protect rather than expropriate private 
property, to cope with the challenge of development. 
 
2.2 Governance Reform for Institutional Development 
Of late in the last two decades, the issue of institutional development or “governance reform” has become more 
prominent (Chang, 2005). Developing countries are poor because their current institutions provide a weak basis in 
terms of incentives that promote growth. This argument raises the question of not only of what type of institutions 
they should design, but also more importantly of how they could develop such institutions. There exist complex 
interactions between the different typologies of institutions (i.e., interaction between formal and informal 
institutions, between different levels of institutions, and between economic and political institutions), which have 
different horizons for change and are therefore subject to very different evolutionary dynamics. Institutional 
reforms typically deal with formal institutions, which can be changed immediately. However, informal institutions 
that serve to legitimize any set of formal rules, such as beliefs and norms, will change only gradually.  
 
As such, if a country opts to adopt the formal rules of another country, it will have very different performance 
characteristics compared to the original country if both the informal norms and the enforcement characteristics are 
different. This implies that transferring successful western market economies’ formal political and economic rules 
to developing economies is not a sufficient condition for generating good economic performance (North, 1992). 
Another reason why underdevelopment cannot be overcome by simply importing institutions that were successful 
in other countries is institutional path dependency. That is, those who make policy and design institutions have a 
stake in the framework they created, and will therefore resist changes that may rob them of power or property 
(Shirley, 2005). 
 
However, the dynamics of institutional change, especially the interplay between economic and political markets is 
a complex aspect that needs to be understood before embarking upon institutional reforms. Since institutions are by 
nature deeply embedded in society, and if growth truly necessitates major institutional transformation in such areas 
as rule of law, property rights protection and governance, among others, then the prospects for growth would seem 
to be dismal in poor countries. In explaining why “good” economic policies based on “correct” economic theories 
have so consistently failed, orthodox economists now invoke institutions. That is, the countries that implemented 
their policies did not have the right institutions, which is why they did not work and not because they were wrong 
to begin with. As a result, the original Washington Consensus of “stabilize, privatize, and liberalize” has now been 
augmented by a long list of so-called “second generation” reforms that are heavily institutional in nature (Rodrik, 
2006). The World Bank and the IMF have been emphasizing the role of institutions in economic development.  
 
2.3 Financial Development and Poverty Reduction 
A good strand of economic literature has established that beyond long-run growth, finance can also lessen the gap 
between the rich and the poor and the degree to which that gap persists across generations. Furthermore, it has 
potentially profound implications for poverty and income distribution by affecting the allocation of capital, as it can 
alter both the rate of economic growth and the demand for labor. There is an emerging body of empirical research, 
suggesting that in practice, improvements in financial contracts, markets, and intermediaries actually do tend to 
expand economic opportunities and reduce persistent income inequality. As such, it is important to care about the 
process of financial development as it has a well-documented nexus with economic and social development and a 
significant role in attaining sustainable long-term growth and poverty alleviation thereby enhancing social welfare. 
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Growth is good, Sustained high growth is better and Sustained high growth with inclusiveness is best of all. 
Inclusive growth in the economy can only be achieved when all the weaker sections of the society including 
agriculture and small-scale industries are nurtured and brought on par with other sections of the society in terms of 
economic development (Swamy, 2010). 
 
2.4 Governance and Financial Regulatory Agencies 
Governance is a concept that has evolved noticeably since it emerged in discussions of development issues during 
the late 1980s. World’s top multinational organisational agencies such as World Bank, International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), European Union (EU), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and Asian Development 
Bank (ADB) have developed their own definition of governance. While, UNDP defines governance as the exercise 
of political, economic, and administrative authority to manage a society’s affairs, ADB defines governance as the 
manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s social and economic resources for 
development. The World Bank uses the same definition. On the other hand, for EU ‘governance’ means “rules, 
processes and behaviour that affect the way in which powers are exercised at European level, particularly as 
regards openness, accountability, effectiveness and coherence 
 
2.5 The Role of the State in Financial Infrastructure  
Financial infrastructure, as defined by World Bank, consists of credit reporting institutions (credit registries and 
bureaus), payment and settlement systems, and the legal framework that governs financial transactions. A well-
developed financial infrastructure provides a sound platform for more efficient credit markets by reducing 
information asymmetries and legal uncertainties that may hamper the supply of new credit. This enhances the depth 
of credit market transactions and broadens access to finance. The global financial crisis has triggered the attention 
of the researchers as well as the policy makers to renew their interest in the role of financial infrastructure in 
supporting systemic stability. Financial infrastructure promotes financial stability in several ways: (i) transparent 
credit reporting supports the internal risk management of financial institutions and provide the financial regulators 
with timely information on the risk profile of systemically important financial institutions, and (ii) well-designed 
payment and security settlement systems enhance financial stability by reducing counterparty risk in interbank 
markets and complex securities and derivatives transactions. 
 
The role of the state in supporting financial infrastructure has diverged over time and across countries. The state’s 
endeavor should be to improve in areas like how state agencies and central banks can operate, regulate, and oversee 
financial infrastructure. Indeed the focus needs to be on two areas: (a) the state’s role in developing and using credit 
information systems, (b) the state’s role in improving payment and securities settlement systems, (c) the state’s role 
in broadening and strengthening retail payment systems, and (d) the states inevitable role in providing a stable legal 
framework that governs financial transactions. 
 
2.6 Credit Information as a Public Good 
The open and transparent exchange of credit information has several characteristics of a public good that benefits 
both borrowers and lenders. How a well-functioning credit-reporting infrastructure performs the role of a public 
good? First, credit reporting benefits banks and nonbank lenders by mitigating problems of moral hazard and 
adverse selection. This, in turn, reduces the cost of financial intermediation and allows banks to price, target, and 
monitor loans more effectively. Second, credit reporting supports financial stability by making it easier for 
financial regulators to assess and monitor systemic risks. Although traditional approaches to financial oversight 
have focused on risks at the level of individual financial institutions, a key advantage of comprehensive credit 
information systems is that they allow regulators to monitor the interconnected risks of systemically important 
financial institutions. Third, open and transparent credit reporting benefits customers by promoting credit market 
competition. The exchange of credit information enables customers to build reputational collateral and to access 
credit outside established lending relationships. This reduces the ability of established lenders to exploit their 
privileged knowledge of clients’ credit histories.  
 
The state therefore needs to play an important role in promoting the exchange of credit information and in 
protecting open and equal access to the market for credit information. Some of the examples across the developing 
block of the globe support this argument: (1) Argentina as a state uses the credit registry information for prudential 
supervision of its financial institutions, (ii) Egypt removed the regulatory barriers to the development of private 
credit bureau, (iii) Mexico employs the state interventions to prevent market fragmentation and closed user groups, 
and (iv) Morocco offers the public support for the development of a private credit bureau. Transparent credit 
information is also a prerequisite for sound risk management and financial stability. However, due to the 
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prevalence of monopoly rents in the market for credit information, information sharing among private lenders may 
not arise naturally. This creates an important rationale for the involvement of the state. 
 
3. Overview of the Indian Financial Sector 
Indian economy being a bank-dominated financial system with more than 75 percent of financial assets held by 
Scheduled Commercial Banks (SCBs), it is desirable to strengthen and stabilize banking system. Though India 
indulges in self-praise of its stable banking system, on an international comparison its position is rather not 
satisfactory, as other banking systems have made significant strides in their structure as well as their performance 
(Table-3.1). India is way behind many of its peers when compared in terms of ATMs per 100,000 adults (8.90); 
whereas Indonesia (16.47), Malaysia (56.43), South Africa (60.01), and Brazil (119.25). Advanced banking systems 
like Australia (166.92), UK (122.77) and USA (173.43) are quite ahead. In terms of outstanding loans from 
commercial banks as percent of GDP too India (51.75%) is a laggard when compared to China (108%), Malaysia 
(104%), South Africa (74%) and Russia (64%). 
 
Table 3.1: Structure and Performance of Banking Systems around the World 
Sl. 
No. 
Country 
Commercia
l bank 
branches 
per 100,000 
adults 
ATMs per 
100,000 
adults 
Outstanding 
deposits with 
commercial 
banks (% of 
GDP) 
Outstanding 
loans from 
commercial 
banks (% of 
GDP) 
Return 
on 
Assets 
(ROA) 
(%) 
1 Australia 29.6 166.9 107.1 128.7 0.1 
2 Brazil 46.1 119.6 53.2 40.2 1.5 
3 China … … 159.2 108.7 1.3 
4 France 41.5 109.8 34.7 42.8 na 
5 Germany 15.7 122.2 27.6 24.2 na 
6 India 10.6 8.9 68.4 51.7 0.9 
7 Indonesia 8.5 16.4 43.3 34.2 1.3 
8 Malaysia 10.4 56.4 130.8 104.2 1.5 
9 
Russian 
Federation 
37.0 152.9 45.0 63.8 
2.5 
10 South Africa 10.7 60.0 45.8 74.4 1.5 
11 U.K 24.8 122.7 422.7 459.9 0.1 
12 USA 35.4 173.4 57.7 46.8 0.3 
Source: Compiled from IMF data 
 
When compared with OECD benchmark the banking parameters of Indian Banking are way behind particularly 
under the indicators; (i) branches per 1000 Sq. Kms, (ii) ATMs per 0.1 million; and  ATMs per 1000 Sq. Kms 
(refer Table 3.2). 
 
Table – 3.2: Key Banking Parameters for India 2004-11 
Indicator 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Benchmar
k OECD 
Branches per 0.1 
million 
8.9 8.9 8.9 9.0 9.3 9.6 10 10.6 10–69    
ATMs per 0.1 million - -  3.3 4.2 5.2 7.1 8.9 47–167  
Deposit accounts per 
1000 people 
607 607 618 648 711 794 864 953 976 -1671 
Loan accounts per 
1000 people 
88 100 100 124 130 132 139 142 248–513  
Branches per 1000 
Sq. Kms 
22 23 23 24 25 27 28 30 159  
ATMs per 1000 Sq. 
Kms 
… … … 9 11 14 20 25 437  
Source: Financial Access Survey of IMF 
Note: The benchmark indicator ranges are for select high-income OECD countries such as Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, The Republic of 
Korea, New Zealand and the United States. 
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Importance of access to finance for the poor arises from the problem of financial exclusion of nearly 3 billion 
people from the formal financial services across the world. With only 34% of population engaged in formal 
banking, India has, 135 million financially excluded households, the second highest number after China. Further, 
the real rate of financial inclusion in India is also very low and about 40% of the bank account, holders use their 
accounts not even once a month. Indian Banking data reveals that credit exclusion is severe in 139 districts of the 
country. In these districts, only 10 per cent or less out of 100 persons have access to credit from the fact that the 
exclusion is large, there is also a wide variation across regions, social groups and asset holdings. The poorer the 
group, the greater is the exclusion (Rangarajan, 2007). The results of the  All-India Debt and Investment Survey of 
2002, also indicate that the share of the non-institutional sources, in the total credit of the cultivator households, 
had increased from 30.6 percent in 1991 to 38.9 percent in 2002 (Karmakar, 2002). According to the NSSO Survey 
59th Round; 51.4% of farmer households are financially excluded from both formal/informal sources (459 lakh out 
of 893 lakh), Of the total farmer households, only 27% access formal sources of credit; one third of this group also 
borrow from non-formal sources and Overall, 73% of farmer households have no access to formal sources of credit.  
 
Inspite of the directed credit policy of the government, India continues suffer from inadequate flow of finance to 
rural and agricultural sectors, with the overall credit to deposit ratio (CDR) still hovering around 70 percent. Food 
credit, which often is directed towards rural and agricultural sectors, is experiencing unsatisfactory and unsteady 
growth rates (table 3.3). 
Table – 3.3: Select Macroeconomic Aggregates of SCBs in India 
(Note: Amount in INR Billion) 
 Year 
 
Aggre 
gate 
Deposits 
 
Food 
Credit 
 
Growth 
rate of 
Food 
Credit 
In % 
Non-Food 
Credit 
 
Bank Credit 
 
Credit  
as 
percen
t 
to 
Aggre
gate 
Depo 
sits 
As percent 
to GDP 
Credi
t 
Aggre 
gate 
Depo 
sits 
2010-11 52079 642 0.33 38778 39420 75 50 66 
2009-10 44928 484 0.05 31962 32447 72 49 68 
2008-09 38341 462 0.04 27293 27755 72 49 68 
2007-08 31969 443 -0.05 23175 23619 73 47 64 
2006-07 26119 465 0.14 18846 19311 73 45 60 
2005-06 21090 406 -0.01 14663 15070 71 40 57 
2004-05 17001 411 0.14 10593 11004 64 33 52 
2003-04 15044 359 -0.27 8048 8407 55 30 54 
2002-03 12808 494 -0.08 6797 7292 56 29 52 
2001-02 11033 539 0.35 5357 5897 53 25 4 
2000-01 9626 399 0.56 4714 5114 53 24 45 
1999-00 8133 256 0.53 4102 4359 53 22 41 
1998-99 7140 168 0.35 3520 3688 51 21 40 
1997-98 5984 124 0.64 3115 3240 54 21 39 
1996-97 5055 75 -0.22 2708 2784 55 20 36 
1995-96 4338 97 -0.20 2442 2540 58 21 36 
1994-95 3868 122 0.13 1992 2115 54 20 38 
1993-94 3151 109 0.62 1535 1644 52 19 36 
1992-93 2685 67 0.44 1452 1519 56 20 35 
1991-92 2307 46 - 1209 1255 54 19 35 
Source: Compiled from RBI Database       Note: 1 USD = INR  62.6981 as of 25.09.2013 
 
 
3.1 Rural Finance by SCBs 
Credit flow to agriculture, which is the main occupation of rural India, has been unsteady inspite of the renewed 
focus frequently emphasized by policy makers and experts on Indian Economy. Though the institutional lenders 
continue to cite their own concerns and constraints like; vagaries of rainfall; chronic defaults; inadequate 
collaterals; problems in marketing of agri-produce; exploitation by middlemen and others, inadequate flow of credit 
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to agriculture (refer table-3.4) still remains a huge concern for economic development in India. There is a greater 
need to reform the flow of institutional finance to agriculture and ensure steady and increasing flow of credit to this 
vital sector to achieve inclusive growth. 
 
Table–3.4: Flow of Credit to Agriculture from SCBs 
(Note: Amount in INR Billion) 
Year Direct Indirect Total 
Direct 
Growth 
Indirect 
Growth 
Total 
Growth 
1992 173.97 14.33 188.30 0.08 0.21 0.09 
1993 189.49 15.52 205.01 0.09 0.08 0.09 
1994 194.65 20.99 215.64 0.03 0.35 0.05 
1995 213.34 28.65 241.99 0.10 0.36 0.12 
1996 238.14 36.74 274.88 0.12 0.28 0.14 
1997 274.48 49.86 324.34 0.15 0.36 0.18 
1998 294.43 63.35 357.78 0.07 0.27 0.10 
1999 330.94 81.17 412.11 0.12 0.28 0.15 
2000 364.66 129.68 494.34 0.10 0.60 0.20 
2001 404.85 188.25 593.10 0.11 0.45 0.20 
2002 465.81 182.38 648.19 0.15 -0.03 0.09 
2003 568.57 236.90 805.47 0.22 0.30 0.24 
2004 707.81 285.20 993.01 0.24 0.20 0.23 
2005 955.65 360.71 1316.3 0.35 0.26 0.33 
2006 1347.98 571.75 1919.7 0.41 0.59 0.46 
2007 1721.28 825.64 2546.9 0.28 0.44 0.33 
2008 2146.44 934.43 3080.8 0.25 0.13 0.21 
2009 2648.93 1107.02 3755.9 0.23 0.18 0.22 
2010 3177.67 1455.54 4633.2 0.20 0.31 0.23 
2011 3602.53 1469.23 5071.7 0.13 0.01 0.09 
    Source: Indian Economy database of RBI           Note: 1 USD = INR  62.6981 as of 25.09.2013 
 
Further, Region-wise exclusion is most acute in Central, Eastern and North-Eastern regions – having a concentration 
of 64% of all financially excluded farmer households (from formal sources) in the country (415.61 lakh households 
out of 649.54 lakh households).Overall indebtedness to formal sources of finance alone is only 19.66% in these three 
regions (4.09% for North-Eastern Region, 18.74% for Eastern Region and 22.41% for Central Region). The un-
banked population is higher in the North Eastern and Eastern regions (Thorat, 2007). Exclusion among the 
Occupational Groups is observed as; Marginal farmer households constitute 66% of total farm households. Only 45% 
of these households are indebted to either formal or non-formal sources of finance (small farmers – 51%, medium 
farmers – 65.1% and large farmers – 66.4%). About 20% of indebted marginal farmer households have access to 
formal sources of credit (medium farmers – 57.6% and large farmers – around 65%). Among non-cultivator 
households, nearly 80% do not access credit from any source. The financially excluded sections largely comprise 
marginal farmers, landless labourers, oral lessees, self-employed and un-organized sector enterprises, urban slum 
dwellers, migrants, ethnic minorities and socially excluded groups, senior citizens, and more importantly women. 
Thus, financial exclusion is a serious concern among low-income households, mainly located in rural areas. 
 
3.2 Rural Finance by RRBs 
Regional Rural Banks, which were formed in 1975 as state owned banks with a mandate to finance rural sectors and 
with a clear focus on agriculture and weaker sections too have not met with any great success even after their 
existence since almost four decades. Inspite of couching support from the government, the business of RRBs 
continues to be meager in the range of 15 to 20 percent (Figure-3.1). Further, although RRB branch presence is 
remarkable in the rural areas, their performance in the provision of financial services is not commensurate. At present, 
RRBs’ share in agriculture credit is 8% while that of commercial banks is about 50% and that of CCS is 42%. Such 
low market share coupled with poor financial performance raises serious issues about the RRB model. Studies have 
also pointed out that in an effort to meet financial performance expectations of shareholders, RRBs appear to be 
drifting from their mission to serve the underserved and unreached in a cost effective way. 
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Figure–3.1: Trend of Business of RRBs 
 
   Source: Author’s compilations from RBI database 
 
 
3.3 Rural Finance by Cooperatives 
Credit Cooperatives in India claim their formal origin since 1904 from the Cooperative Societies Act and quite a long 
history even greater than that of their Chinese counterparts, which came into formal existence only in 1958. However, 
in terms of their loan outreach, Indian Credit Cooperatives have failed miserably when compared to their Chinese 
counterparts. While the annual growth rate of flow credit from Indian Cooperatives is in the negative range (Table-
3.5), the Chinese credit cooperatives are experiencing growth in the range of 45 to 55 percent.   
 
Table – 3.5: Flow of Credit by Cooperatives 
(Note: Amounts in INR Billion) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s compilations from RBI database  
  Note: 1 USD = INR  62.6981 as of 25.09.2013 
 
Indian Credit Cooperative sector is of three tier structure comprising; Primary Agricultural Credit Societies (PACSs); 
Primary Cooperative Agricultural and Rural Development Banks (PCARDBs); and State Cooperative Agricultural 
and Rural Development Banks (SCARDBs). While District Central Cooperative Banks (DCCBs) fund the PACSs, 
PCARDBs are funded by SCARDBs. Though, on an average, there is one PACS for every 6 villages, the growth rate 
of overall credit by credit cooperatives is indeed in the negative range which is a much concerning factor. Figure 3.6 
presents a snapshot of the performance of the PACSs during the pre and post reform period. Even after in existence 
since more than a century, cooperatives have not been successful in terms of either financial sustainability or outreach. 
 
 
Year PACSs SCARDBs PCARDBs TOTAL Growth Rate 
2010-11 … 101.2 56.2 157.5 0.85 
2009-10 764.8 169.9 115.1 1049.1 -0.15 
2008-09 640.4 162.7 112.2 915.3 0.04 
2007-08 656.6 183.2 118.0 957.9 -0.07 
2006-07 586.2 186.4 121.7 894.4 -0.09 
2005-06 517.7 176.7 128.7 823.2 -0.04 
2004-05 487.8 174.0 126.3 788.2 -0.10 
2003-04 438.7 162.2 113.3 714.3 -0.04 
2002-03 424.1 153.3 108.0 685.5 -0.06 
2001-02 407.7 141.1 100.0 648.9 -0.17 
2000-01 345.2 125.9 82.7 553.9 -0.16 
1999-00 285.4 115.9 75.7 477.1 -0.48 
1998-99 148.9 104.4 68.1 321.5 -0.11 
1997-98 139.9 91.8 58.4 290.1 -0.10 
1996-97 133.4 80.1 49.3 262.9 -0.10 
1995-96 129.8 68.5 40.9 239.3 -0.57 
1994-95 99.9 25.0 27.0 152.0 -0.07 
1993-94 93.9 20. 27.0 141.9 0.03 
1992-93 102.5 19.6 24.8 146.3 -0.41 
1991-92 81.7 0.3 21.4 103.5 … 
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Table – 3.6: Snapshot of Performance of PACSs – Pre and Post Reform period 
Performance per PACS 1993-94 2003-04 2010-11 
Membership 972 1281 1298 
Number of Borrowers 552 485 561 
Working Capital (in INR millions)  1.7 5.86 15.43 
Reserves (in INR millions) 0.08 0.30 0.73 
Deposits (in INR millions) 0.22 1.71 3.98 
Loans and Advances (in INR millions) 1.15 4.14 9.39 
Over dues (in INR millions) 0.45 1.54 2.42 
      Source: NAFSCOB       Note: 1 USD = INR  62.6981 as of 25.09.2013 
 
Figure 3.2 presents the trend of institutional credit by cooperatives including PACSs, PCARDBs, SCARDBs and the 
overall cooperative sector during the post reform period. It is concerning to note that the annual growth rate in terms 
of outstanding credit is experiencing a negative growth during most part of the post reform period (almost upto 2009-
10). 
Figure – 3.2: Growth Rates of Institutional Credit by Cooperatives 
 
  Source: Author’s compilations from RBI database 
 
 
3.4 Problem of Demand – Supply Gap 
India’s Rural Financial Sector (RFS) is subject to systemic policy issues and pervasive institutional weaknesses. Lack 
of autonomy and weak governance have affected sustainability of Rural Financial Institutions (RFIs) and constrained 
outreach. This, among others, impedes diversification to non-farm activities for supporting value addition and 
employment generation. Further, the risks in RFS due to droughts and floods are accentuated by the weak rural 
infrastructure and by production and marketing bottlenecks. The resulting low prices, productivity, and profitability 
make it difficult for the rural sector to compete for capital with urban areas. Rural credit is only 10% of total 
commercial bank advances. Thus, a demand and supply gap exists, despite the extensive RFS. The rural poor and 
women, in particular, have inadequate access to financial services and the disadvantages that the rural poor face due to 
limited access to finance are accentuated by the inadequacy of risk mitigating instruments to insure against the risk 
they face. 
 
4. Financial Services towards Inclusive Growth 
Developing responsive institutions, those located in rural areas and those that affect the rural poor , is a crucial 
question for economic policy-making as governments try to accelerate rural development and poverty 
reduction in economies that are increasingly market-based. It has been well established that strong and widely 
accepted institutions – organizations and rules – that respond to the needs and priorities of poor groups, 
especially the rural poor and women, are essential for rapid poverty reduction. Nevertheless, the reverse is 
perhaps even truer. Weak, ineffective, corrupt or narrowly based institutions create uncertainty and unfairness, 
discourage saving and investment, and lower growth rates. 
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For achieving the objective of sustainable and inclusive economic growth, it is important to bring the under -
served sectors/sections of society within the domain of institutional finance. In the Indian context, the flow of 
Institutional finance to agriculture (refer figure 4.1) has been skewed and uneven in terms of both period and 
quantum. 
 
Figure–4.1: Growth Rates of Institutional Finance to Agriculture 
  
Source: Author’s compilations from RBI database 
 
 
4.1 Reforming the Rural Financial Architecture 
Keeping in view the dynamics of the changing economy, there is a strong need to reform the rural financial 
system. The present system that was enshrined in the late 70s greatly needs a rigorous relook. Reforms in the 
rural financial architecture should be focused towards evolving a new financial architecture to suit the needs 
of inclusive growth. Regional Rural Banks – the unfinished agenda of the Indian rural financial system need to 
be revitalized; (i) by liberating them from the clutches of their sponsor banks (ii) Government of India has to 
become proactive like the way China has been doing in the case of its policy banks towards achieving the 
larger goals of inclusive growth (iii) bring in new talent which is abundantly in the open market at the senior 
management level to bring in professionalism and focus in their operations instead of continuing them as the 
retiring rooms of the sponsor bank executives. Compared to the vision and focus with which RRBs were 
instituted by the late Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi in 1975, they have failed to reach the expectations.  
 
Is Privatization of RRBs a good measure? 
Simply a mad rush approach towards privatization, particularly in the Indian context is harmful given the 
experience of privatization in the Indian financial sector since 1992-93. Indian privatization saga has failed to 
demonstrate their commitment to provision of services to the needy and the poor. Besides the private banks 
have not made any inroads into rural areas for provision of financial services which establishes clearly their 
biased approach.  
 
Even after two decades of liberalisation and opening of banking sector for new generation banks, their 
penetration levels have not been satisfactory. Closure of several private sector banks like Global Trust Bank 
and a number of fraudulent NBFCs indicate that private firms have focused only on profit maximization by 
ignoring customer service and customer welfare. Given this backdrop, the following institutional reform 
measures are for RRBs are suggested here below. 
Table–4.1: Institutional Reform Measures for RRBs 
Domain Current measure Suggested reform measure 
Legal Framework RRB Act, 1976 Merger with BR Act 1949 
Regulation 
and Supervision 
Multiple regulators like; Sponsor 
Banks, NABARD, RBI etc., 
Single regulator i.e. RBI 
Governance 
RRB Boards lack professionalism as 
dominated by the whims and fancies 
Boards need to be inducted with qualified professionals and 
experts along with the nominated members. 
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of the sponsor bank official (with 
conflict of interest) on the board 
whose bank in turn is a competitor to 
the same RRB for which he is the 
director. 
 
Many RRBs staff complains about the high handedness of 
Sponsor Bank officials. As such, measures need to be taken to 
free the RRBs from the clutches of sponsor banks. 
 
RRB Chairmen should be recruited based on merit, suitability, 
expertise, experience and worthiness rather than on seniority 
Benchmarking 
Currently no bench marking has been 
possible due to the inherent diversities 
and heterogeneities. 
Benchmarking could be done once uniform measures are 
introduced and relevant measures be introduced for 
benchmarking. 
Technology induction 
for MIS and Customer 
Service 
Technology has been inducted 
haphazardly in their own 
individualistic approach. 
Uniform and standard computer technology needs to be inducted 
across all the RRBs on par with commercial banks 
Human Resource 
Development 
Most of the RRBs suffer from 
incapable and untrained staff that 
seems to be inefficient. 
Rigorous training and management development programmes 
required to be offered to the current staff and up gradation of 
their skills is foremost in carrying out their responsibilities. 
 
Career path need to well laid out based on merit and 
performance instead of on seniority alone. Accordingly, relevant 
laws need to be amended. 
 
4.2 Reforming the Cooperatives 
Cooperative sector needs revitalization as had been often deliberated (refer Vaidyanathan, 2004). The revival 
package based on the Vaidyanathan Committee recommendations and after due deliberations was a combination of 
legal and institutional reforms, capital infusion and technical support for capacity building. The implementation of 
the action Plan [ADB 2010] of the revival package was perceived to result in the emergence of a strong, self-reliant 
and well-knit network of rural cooperative credit system. The implementation of the revival package involved 
planning and execution of a series of action plans for: (i) facilitating legal, regulatory and governance framework; 
(ii) institutional reforms for sustainability; (iii) financial package and; and (iv) eligibility norms. However, no 
perceptible change has been felt on the ground more probably due to the lack of political will in the implementation 
of the reforms. Given this background some plausible institutional reform measures for credit cooperatives are 
suggested here below (table 4.2).  
 
Table–4.2: Institutional Reform Measures for Credit Cooperatives 
Domain Current measure Suggested reform measure 
Legal Framework State Cooperative Laws 
Enact new national cooperative laws and measures to 
encompass the state laws 
Regulation 
and Supervision 
Multiple regulators like; state 
governments, NABARD, RBI etc., 
Single regulator i.e. NABARD 
Accounting 
Standards 
Different standards, age old and archaic, 
not smooth and transparent for audit and 
supervision. 
Transparent and uniform accounting standards in 
accordance with the international practices 
Auditing 
Currently state government officials 
perform the audit 
Instead the audit responsibilities have to be vested with 
the regulator/supervisor i.e. NABARD 
Governance 
Local Boards are dominated by the 
whims and fancies politicians and state 
government officials 
Boards need to be inducted with qualified professionals 
and experts along with the elected members. 
Recruitment of Staff 
Locally appointed under the influence of 
the local politicians and state 
government officials resulting in 
heterogeneity. 
National level recruitment boards with uniformity in 
standards of qualification and expertise for recruitment of 
staff. 
National cooperative service could be though t of to 
develop specialized cadre for the sector. 
Financial Packages 
Under the discretion of the state 
governments and national governments 
Need to be decided by the supervising and regulatory 
body such as NABARD. 
Benchmarking 
Currently no bench marking has been 
possible due to the inherent diversities 
and heterogeneities. 
Benchmarking could be done once uniform measures are 
introduced and relevant measures be introduced for 
benchmarking. 
Technology 
induction for MIS 
and Customer 
Service 
Technology has been inducted 
haphazardly in their own individualistic 
approach. 
Uniform and standard computer technology needs to be 
inducted across all the credit cooperatives 
Human Resource 
Development 
 
Most of the credit cooperatives suffer 
from incapable and untrained staff that 
seems to be inefficient. 
Rigorous training and management development 
programmes required to be offered to the current staff 
and up gradation of their skills is foremost in carrying out 
their responsibilities. 
Corruption control Complaints of huge misuse of office for Measures need to be twined into the system so that there 
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personal gain, impairs operating 
efficiency, 
misallocates resources from the efficient 
to the dishonest and hurts mostly the 
poor 
is significant reduction in the scope for corruption with 
adequate checks and balances built in    
 
 
4.3 Institutional Reforms in Commercial Banks    
SCBs in view of their massive outreach continue to play a significant role in provision of financial services to the 
poor particularly the rural poor. However, due to various factors like the apathy of the bank staff and other 
attitudinal issues in serving their rural clientele and lack of basic infrastructure, the provision of financial services 
in a more effective manner has been hindered for the commercial banks. Further there are also supervisory and 
regulatory issues hampering in the area of rural finance by the commercial banks. The current structure of Indian 
banking particularly for commercial banks to provide financial services to the rural poor need to be strengthened. 
SCBs need to made to comply with statutorily finance upto an extent of 40 % of their annual net credit 
disbursements towards rural finance. And also various sub targets like; finance to weaker sections, finance to 
women, finance to agriculture are required to be rigorously implemented in order to channelize the much needed 
credit to the rural sectors. 
 
4.4 Reforming the Regulatory Architecture and Strengthening Interregulatory Coordination 
There is a need to reform the regulatory structure as they have cropped up with lack of regulatory coordination. As 
shown in Figure 4.2, the current system involves half a dozen apex regulatory agencies (like; RBI, NABARD, 
SEBI, IRDA, PFRDA, FMC, EPFO, SIDBI, NHB, etc.) apart from several ministries in the government that retain 
direct regulatory powers. This structure leads to major regulatory overlaps and regulatory gaps. Sometimes this 
structure also can lead to regulatory arbitrage as institutions that come under different regulators and are therefore 
subject to different regulatory requirements may offer similar financial services. The overlapping regulatory 
structure also becomes a barrier to innovation as any new product might need approval from more than one 
regulator. In some cases, it is not even clear which regulator has primary jurisdiction over the product. In addition, 
multiplicity of regulators creates severe problems with interagency coordination. In India these coordination 
mechanisms are not formalized, and though these mechanisms can be effective in emergencies, they are not quite 
as effective at other times. Coordination problems are aggravated by the uneven skills and experience across 
regulators 
Figure–4.2: Present Structure of Financial System in India 
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This structure needs to be relooked into with the perspective of regulatory integration as is done in many of the 
countries across the globe. 
 
Table–4.4: Pros and Cons of Integrating Financial Sector Supervision 
Potential Pros Potential cons 
Easier to achieve efficiency in supervision of 
financial conglomerates 
If objectives are not clearly specified, may result 
ineffective than the sectoral supervisors 
Could achieve possible economies of scale 
Possibilities of diseconomies of scale if any 
organisation is too large to manage 
Could improve accountability 
Possibilities of moral hazard problems and  across the 
financial sector and resultant less accountability 
Helpful in elimination of duplicities and turf 
wars of sectoral supervisors and speeds up 
decision making as well as implementation 
Sometimes the process of integration may get 
influenced by political/extraneous vested interest 
motivated changes in supervisory framework 
Easier to ensure level playing field across 
market segments 
Process of integration if not managed properly may 
lead to loss of key staff or to other problems 
 
 
4.4 Provision of Financial Services to the Poor by Microfinance Institutions 
Indian microfinance sector can be categorized into three main groups: (i) the SHG-Bank linkage model accounting 
for about 58% of the outstanding loan portfolio, (ii) non-banking finance companies accounting for about 34% of 
the outstanding loan portfolio (iii) others including trusts, societies, etc, accounting for the balance 8% of the 
outstanding loan portfolio. The borrowers in the microfinance sector are in general particularly from the vulnerable 
sections of society and they suffer from; lack of individual bargaining power, inadequate financial literacy, fragile 
economic environment and exposed to external shocks which they are ill-equipped to absorb. Hence, the financiers 
and MFI-NBFCs can easily exploit them. 
 
Further, Malegam Committee (2011) on Microfinance set up by RBI has suggested that the size of an individual 
loan should be restricted to INR 25,000 and to prevent over-borrowing, the aggregate value of all outstanding loans 
of an individual borrower should also be restricted to INR 25,000. However, keeping in view the unabated rise of 
inflation, which usually affects the poor first, the definition limit for MFI loan, should be indeed raised to INR 
50000. However, the issue of great concern is that of optimizing the performance of microfinance institutions, 
which is dependent on the access and sustainability of the financial services offered by these institutions (refer 
figure 4.3). 
 
Figure–4.3: Optimizing Performance of Financial Institutions 
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One important aspect that needs to be built into the institutional structure of microfinance particularly with the 
MFI-NBFCs is to provide the micro-insurance services to the poor in a package approach with micro credit. The 
regulation of microfinance sector needs to be effected with the prioritised objectives, viz: (i) improving 
transparency; (ii) accountability; (iii) reduction of transaction costs; (iv) better operating systems; (iv) 
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simplification of documentation and procedures; (v) better corporate governance; (vi) increasing healthy 
competition. Further, the regulatory responsibilities of the microfinance sector should be vested with RBI instead of 
NABARD as it has failed to evolve itself into a visible, proactive regulator inspite of its existence since 1982. 
Some of the critics have indeed referred to the functioning of NABARD as that of ‘white elephant’ in view of its 
ineffectiveness but only as a refinancing accountant under the shadow of RBI. 
 
Institutional Reforms Designed for Poverty Alleviation 
The most direct channel through which governance affects poverty is via its impact on service delivery. Poverty 
reduction depends on improvements in the quality and accessibility to poor people of basic education, health, 
potable water and other social and infrastructure services. Perhaps the most profound impact of institutional reform 
on poverty comes via the potential for increases in citizen participation. There is a variety of ways in which 
strengthening “voice” in general—and the voice of the poor in particular—can improve public performance. At the 
micro-level, they include fostering participation of parents in the governance of schools or working with 
communities to provide access to water. At the macro-level, they include well-designed modes of decentralization 
and, more broadly, various forms of representative decision making and political oversight. 
 
Accountability of the responsible decision makers has indeed to be enhanced in order to speed up quality in service 
delivery. Mechanisms need to be imbibed into the systems so that there is no scope for misuse of the official 
position or ignorance or indifference or apathy by the employees. However, the suggested reform measures need to 
accompanied with concomitant research in the key areas like; (i) what is the true nature of these policies and their 
potential to affect the working of rural financial markets? (ii) What are the measures initiated to overcome some of 
the negative consequences of reforms like exclusion of poor and small borrowers, increasing cost of borrowing and 
growing influence of informal sources? How far these measures have helped reverse the negative consequences? 
(iii) What is the evolving institutional structure in rural areas to meet the emerging credit needs? What are the 
merits and demerits of institutional changes for ensuring affordable and hassle free access to financial services by 
the rural households in general and small and marginal farmers in particular? (iv) What are the innovative product 
and services developed by the RFIs to meet the diverse financial service needs of rural households? In what way 
these innovations have proved beneficial. How far some of the controversial innovations like commodity futures 
and derivatives have delivered for the farmers? (v) What is the impact of these reforms and innovations on the farm 
economy? How far these measures have contributed for either aggravating or mitigating the agrarian crisis? 
 
5. Conclusion 
Inclusion, growth, and stability are the three objectives of any institutional reform process, though these 
objectives sometimes seem to be contradictory. With the right reforms, the financial sector can be an enormous 
source of job creation both directly as well as indirectly, through the enterprise and consumption it can support 
with financing particularly for the poor. The institutional reforms in the Indian financial sector should hence be 
motivated with the prime objective of making the services work for the poor and enable them to steer out of the 
chronic poverty they have been subjected to since generations and ages. Without reforms, however, the financial 
sector could become an increasing source of risk, as the mismatches between the capacity and needs of the real 
economy and the capabilities of the financial sector widen. India has been a case study of how financial sector 
reforms can play a supporting role in the growth of an emerging market economy. The challenge is how to 
bootstrap from these past successes to escalate to the next level of financial sector development, so that it can 
continue to support the growth in general and Inclusive growth in particular that India faces going forward. 
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Annexure – 1: A Glimpse of Banking Sector in India 
Indicators 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Number of Commercial Banks 293 291 288 222 182 173 170 167 167 
(a) Scheduled Commercial Banks (SCBs) 288 286 284 218 178 169 166 163 163 
of which: Regional Rural Banks 196 196 196 133 96 90 86 82 82 
(b) Non – SCBs  5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Number of Bank Offices in India 68500 69170 70373 72072 74653 78787 82897 88203 93080 
       (a) Rural 32283 32227 30790 30251 30409 30927 31598 32529 33602 
       (b) Semi-Urban 15135 15288 15325 15991 16770 18027 19337 21022 23048 
       (c) Urban 11566 11806 12419 13232 14202 15566 16726 18288 19156 
       (d) Metropolitan 9516 9750 11839 12598 13272 14267 15236 16364 17274 
Population per Office (in thousands) 16 16 16 16 15 15 15 14 13 
Aggregate deposits of SCBs in India (INR billion) 13117 15044 17001 21090 26119 31969 38341 44928 52079 
Bank credit of SCBs (INR billion) 7464 8407 11004 15070 19311 23619 27755 32447 39420 
Deposits of SCBs per office (INR million) 192 226 257 304 367 434 498 547 609 
Credit of SCBs per office (INR million) 114 133 170 220 275 322 361 398 457 
Per capita Deposit of SCBs (in INR) 12253 14089 16281 19130 23382 28610 33919 39107 46321 
Per capita Credit of SCBs (INR) 7275 8273 10752 13869 17541 21218 24617 28431 34800 
Deposits of SCBs as percentage to Gross  National 
Product at factor cost (at current prices) 
58 59 60 65 70 74 78 73 71 
SCBs Advances to Priority Sectors (INR billion) 2182 2766 3706 5127 6553 7814 9089 10915 13158 
Share of Priority Sector Advances in Total Advances 
of SCBs (per cent) 
29 32 32 33 33 31 30 31 30 
Credit-Deposit Ratio (per cent) 56 55 62 70 73 74 73 73 76 
Cash-Deposit Ratio (per cent) 6.3 7.2 6.4 6.7 7.2 9.7 7.3 7.7 8 
Source: RBI Database    Note: 1 USD = INR  62.6981 as of 25.09.2013 
 
 
